When all hell broke loose

When all hell broke loose
Deccan Herald

Brand Bangalore is in jeopardy – the police failed to protect citizens, and the government machinery collapsed on Wednesday and Thursday

The Bangalore city police failed to act in time against the rioters in the aftermath of Rajkumar’s death. This reflects poorly on the police leadership. Director-General of Police B S Sial was away in New Delhi on Wednesday to attend a meeting of the police chiefs and the chief ministers of Naxalite-affected states. However the Police Commissioner was very much around and theoretically he could have acted effectively but for some reason did not.

Chief Minister H D Kumaaraswamy has stated that elements of the police were away on election duty outside the state and some were on duty out of the capital, and that there was a shortage of police manpower.

However, it is not clear if some policemen were shifted out of Bangalore. In a sense the police failure to tackle the breakdown of law and order following Rajkumar’s death is reminiscent of the Cauvery riots that rocked the city during the early 1990s. In both cases the police remained inactive. Was the police inaction by default this time? Initially, the police caned and teargassed the rampaging mobs.

When that did not work, they resorted to firing on a limited scale. Probably, had it been a communal riot, the police would have resorted to heavy firing and there would have been a large number of deaths.

Clearly the tax payers’ money spent on the police did not yield the desired results since the citizens were denied security from rioters. Whom else can law-abiding citizens turn to in such a crisis? Perhaps they would be compelled to buy personal weapons to protect themselves from lawless elements if the police cannot do the job that they are paid to do.

Despite a powerful police presence, Bangalore burnt for two days with rioters having a field day. The 13,000 sanctioned strength of men spread over 44 police stations — backed by 4,000-strong City Armed Reserve (CAR), 4,000 Karnataka State Reserve Police and 57 mobile patrols — proved inadequate. Clearly CAR, the paramilitary arm of the Bangalore city police, was not effectively deployed for the purpose it exists. CAR has two strike forces — one for the north and the other for the south — to respond to such breakdowns of law and order across the city’s 224.66 sq km area. Besides there was some Rapid Action Force presence. Yet it was not deployed at all.

Does this imply there was a failure of decision-making at some level in the police chain of command or the absence of political directive to the the police leadership to do their job?

Though the Hoysala mobile patrol vehicles are linked to the police control room — through wireles communication — and operate round the clock to cover every nook and corner of the city, Bangalore became a battleground. Anti-social elements ruled the roost. Citizens were terrorised, their cars and properties torched and life in general thrown out of gear. The absence of law and order was characterised by chaos and mayhem.

While the Bangalore city police are to be blamed for their failure to control the riots the political leadership which provides the direction for their action or inaction is equally responsible.

This is particularly unfortunate at a time when the city needs a safe environment to attract FDI in competition with Hyderabad, Faridabad and Pune.

Bangalore has in general enjoyed the image of being a safe and secure city that has attracted capital from various parts of the country. Brand Bangalore is now in jeopardy.